Why Delegation is an Important Skill to Get Workdone? Figure out the Qualities required in Delegating Effectively!

Abstract:

Delegation is a tool and a skill that can be used to garner more control of a team that also helps boost the professional development of the team members. It allows for more growth overall. Delegating duties is an ability that can be taught and improved on through time, just like any other skill. But often leaders wonder; how to delegate effectively. So, here are some answers to some common questions regarding delegation; that can help you successfully delegate and achieve the overall success of your team.

Keywords:

Delegation, Manager, Leader, Corporate Culture, Professional, Teamwork

Learning Outcomes 

After undergoing this article you will be able to understand the following

1. What's exactly Delegation?

2. Why Delegation is so important?

3. Why should you delegate?

4. When is perfect time to delegate?

5. How to delegate tasks?

6. What are the benefits of delegating?

7. What's the qualities required for delegating tasks?

8. What's strategies are necessary for effective delegation?

9. Conclusion

10. FAQs

References 

1. What's exactly Delegation?

Delegation is the process of distributing and entrusting work to another person. In management or leadership within an organisation, it involves a manager aiming to efficiently distribute work, decision-making and responsibility to subordinate workers in an organization.

2. Why Delegation is so important?

Delegation of authority is a process in which the authority and powers are divided and shared amongst the subordinates. When the work of a manager gets beyond his capacity, there should be some system of sharing the work. This is how delegation of authority becomes an important tool in organization function.

Through delegation, a manager, in fact, is multiplying himself/herself by dividing/multiplying his/her work with the subordinates. The importance of delegation can be justified by -

1. Through delegation, a manager is able to divide the work and allocate it to the subordinates. This helps in reducing his work load so that he can work on important areas such as - planning, business analysis etc.

2. With the reduction of load on superior, he can concentrate his energy on important and critical issues of concern. This way he is able to bring effectiveness in his work as well in the work unit. This effectivity helps a manager to prove his ability and skills in the best manner.

3. Delegation of authority is the ground on which the superior-subordinate relationship stands.

   An organization functions as the authority flows from top level to bottom. This in fact shows that through delegation, the superior-subordinate relationship become meaningful. The flow of authority is from top to bottom which is a way of achieving results.

4. Delegation of authority in a way gives enough room and space to the subordinates to flourish their abilities and skill.

   Through delegating powers, the subordinates get a feeling of importance. They get motivated to work and this motivation provides appropriate results to a concern.

   Job satisfaction is an important criterion to bring stability and soundness in the relationship between superior and subordinates.

   Delegation also helps in breaking the monotony of the subordinates so that they can be more creative and efficient.

5. Delegation of authority is not only helpful to the subordinates but it also helps the managers to develop their talents and skills. Since the manager get enough time through delegation to concentrate on important issues, their decision-making gets strong and in a way they can flourish the talents which are required in a manager.

   Through granting powers and getting the work done, helps the manager to attain communication skills, supervision and guidance, effective motivation and the leadership traits are flourished. Therefore it is only through delegation, a manager can be tested on his traits.

6. Delegation of authority is help to both superior and subordinates. This, in a way, gives stability to a concern’s working.

   With effective results, a concern can think of creating more departments and divisions flow working. This will require creation of more managers which can be fulfilled by shifting the experienced, skilled managers to these positions. This helps in both virtual as well as horizontal growth which is very important for a concern’s stability.

Briefly, Delegating effectively saves time, helps you as a leader and your team develop as professionals, prepares you to manage larger teams, and inspires employees and team members to perform better. Delegation is an important management skill to work on through your career. Delegation is a valuable tool for strategic planning, personal growth, and pursuing and promoting development. As you start to give yourself additional responsibilities, you gain experience and are able to take on even more responsibilities. As a manager, it is your primary responsibility to develop a healthy business culture and ensure cooperation and well-organized division of the workforce. Delegation will help you do that.

3. Why should you delegate the tasks?

Before understanding how to delegate, let’s understand why you should delegate. Delegation provides several advantages for both leaders and employees. It assists executives in managing their workload and increasing production, while also assisting staff in identifying and developing their strengths and working on their weaknesses. Delegation, when done correctly, may be used for professional growth as well as identifying top performance.

While the advantages of delegation are evident, effectively delegating is not always simple but it can be acquired, polished, and developed until it becomes second nature, just like any other ability or skill.

The effective delegation also improves a team’s productivity and time management by utilizing its members’ existing capabilities while also allowing them to gain new information and abilities during the process. As a result, the team is more adaptable and may split responsibilities as needed. When you delegate effectively, you can build employee trust and commitment, boost productivity, and ensure that the right people are completing the tasks that are most suited to them.

4. When to delegate the tasks?

Delegation should be part of your leadership journey from the very beginning. By understanding how much control you need to maintain over the process, you can determine the best strategy for empowering workers. And this is not something you will be able to achieve in a short span of time. So it’s always a good time to delegate. Initially some team members might need a little more help even though you have delegated the work to them, and that’s ok. This will help you understand how to match people to projects that best utilize their skills. Effective delegation guarantees that you obtain the best end-result in every project.

5. How to delegate tasks - the process or steps?

Delegating effectively needs crystal clear communication so that everyone knows exactly what is expected of them.

Choose the right people for the job – Understanding your team members’ talents and preferences is an important part of being an effective leader and to be able to delegate. If you need to assign a task that will take a lot of teamwork to complete, delegate it to someone who works well with a team and in collaboration with others. You could try to sit down with your team and create a list of topics you want to discuss, allowing employees or team members to self-select the responsibilities they wish to take up.

Make resources and training available to all employees or team members – When you assign a task, make sure the individual you have assigned the task to has all the necessary tools and resources to complete it—or provide them a way to practice those talents and find those resources. Connect them to courses and tools to help them build skills they don’t have. Making resources available may take more time up front, but getting the task done correctly can save you time in the long run.

Be specific and clear about the task – Your team or employees will be more likely to provide you with the expected outcome if they know what your expectations are. Setting clear expectations aids them in planning how to complete the work. Set project benchmarks so you can keep an eye on things without micromanaging. If an employee fails to meet a deadline, there is still time to remedy the situation before the final product is delivered.

Create an encouraging environment and culture – As a senior executive or manager, you need to create an environment where individuals feel safe and encouraged to make decisions, ask questions, and take the measures necessary to finish the work. This will allow you to understand each employee’s strengths and weaknesses and understand how to delegate better.

Support your team members or employees – Your employees and team members require resources and assistance from you in order to achieve the greatest potential results while delegating. Employees sometimes require assistance in determining what they are doing well and how they might improve. Delegating duties requires both giving and receiving feedback. As a leader, this is also a wonderful approach to keep track of the responsibilities you have delegated.

Take feedback and be appreciative – To improve delegation in the future, use feedback loops. The most critical aspect of the delegating process is the feedback stage, which works both ways. If your employees have completed a task to your satisfaction, publicly congratulate them and provide genuine appreciation. If they are falling short, do not be hesitant to point out where they went wrong. Encouraging your employees or team members to express their ideas on how you are delegating, on the other hand, is a key opportunity for you to discover if you are giving enough information or giving the proper tasks to the right people. Recognize and celebrate the achievements as well as recognize the struggles. Workers will be more productive and committed if they are aware that their efforts are being noticed and helps the members realize the level of effort you expect from them. It increases their desire to collaborate with you on future initiatives.

Summarily, 10 Steps for Effective Delegation are the following:

• Step 1 – Identify the task. 
• Step 2 – Choose who to delegate the task to. 
• Step 3 – Confirm level of interest.
• Step 4 – Clearly define the task. 
• Step 5 – Clarify level of responsibility, authority, and accountability. 
• Step 6 – Establish timeframes and completion date.
• Step 7 - Express confidence
• Step 8 - Monitor progress and give feedback
• Step 9 - Give credit
• Step 10 - Review

6. What are the benefits of delegating?

Delegation can be a difficult process because most people often believe that they are the only ones who can properly complete the task. It is naturally difficult to put your faith in others to take on responsibilities and to believe in your team’s talents to complete them well. Knowing how to delegate successfully is what distinguishes stressed, overworked, and uninteresting leaders from those who genuinely enjoy their work and inspire their team to achieve tremendous success. Here are some benefits of delegation;

Free up your time to achieve more – As a leader, you are swamped with more demands than you have time to handle. The first and most obvious benefit of delegation is that it frees up your time so that you can focus on more significant duties.

Increase your team’s flexibility – When delegating duties to your team, be sure to distribute the work across the members of your team. As a result, your team’s flexibility will expand, and everyone’s abilities will grow, which is beneficial to the organization and each member’s professional abilities.

Grow your team’s efficiency – You can make better use of everyone’s time by delegating duties to all your team members. As a result, the entire team will accomplish far more. It is impossible for you to do everything on your own, so assigning jobs to them ensures that everyone has a sufficient workload or equal responsibilities.

7. What's the qualities required for delegating tasks?

Effective delegation is a process that can improve your leadership and typically requires the following skills:

• Communication. 
• Training. 
• Time management. 
• Providing constructive feedback. 
• Determine what tasks to delegate. 
• Communicate the project's goal. 
• Identify the team's strengths. 
• Offer enough notice.

8. What's strategies are necessary for effective delegation?

Effective delegation has two elements: delegating work to team members who have skills in that area, and giving team members opportunities to develop new skills. To do this, make sure you clearly understand each team member's strengths—as well as their interests.

8 Ways To Make The Most Of Your Team's Time And Talent in delegation 

• Focus on activities you do best. 
• Provide clear, concise instructions. 
• Balance delegation and micromanaging. 
• Assign tasks to the right people. 
• Set biweekly meetings to discuss projects.
• Model the behavior you'd like to see.
• Assess each team member's skills
• Delegate outcomes, not tasks.

9. Conclusion

If you understand the importance of delegation in leadership and know how to delegate effectively, you can build employee trust and commitment, boost productivity, and ensure that the proper individuals are completing the activities that are most suited to them. Delegating is not always simple, and the process is not always straightforward, but the sooner you get started, the sooner you will gain the skills to do it well. Recognize that the process will never be flawless, but use your experiences to improve it. Don’t be frightened to hand the torch to someone else. To become a great delegator, you will need some practice, but if you put in the effort, you and your team will be able to effectively collaborate and move forward.

10. FAQs

Q.1 : What are the 4 types of delegation?

Ans : There are primarily four types of delegation of authorities: 

general or specific delegation, top to bottom or 

bottom to top, 

formal or informal delegation, and 

lateral delegation. 

Lateral delegation may be done when a worker requires assistance to complete the task delegated to them by a superior.

Q.2.: What are five 5 key principles of delegation?

Ans : About the Five (5) Rights of Delegation are

• Right Task.
• Right Circumstances.
• Right Person.
• Right Direction / Communication.
• Right Supervision / Evaluation.

Q.3.: What are the three pillars of delegation?

Ans.: The 3 Pillars of Delegation are

• Assign Responsibility. You make clear that the team member to whom you are delegating is now responsible for the outcome of this effort. 
• Provide Authority. The team member to whom you are delegating must have or be explicitly given the power to accomplish the task. 
• Require Accountability.

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